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The auditor‟s role in society is that of validating the truth and fairness of financial statements.  
If owners of organisations doubt the auditor‟s independence, financial statements will lack 
credibility. This questionnaire-based study investigated how investors perceive three 
potentially independence-impairing auditor-client relationships: the joint provision of audit 
and non-audit services, an audit firm‟s economic dependence upon a client and long term 
relationships between auditor and client. The objective was to determine whether, after a 
series of high-profile corporate collapses, owners retain faith in the integrity of the auditor. 
The results suggest that economic dependence and the provision of non-audit services are 
perceived as greater threats to auditor independence than long-term relationships between the 
auditor and client.  
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The UK House of Commons Treasury Committee (2009:76) stated that „public confidence in 
the operation of capital markets depends in part on the credibility of corporate reports 
produced by boards of directors‟. The auditors‟ role in society is to assure interested third 
parties that these corporate reports and financial statements are a true and fair reflection of 
company performance.  In order to perform this role, it is essential that auditors are 
independent of the client company (Lavin, 1977:237). If the owners of organisations doubt 
the auditors‟ independence, financial statements will lack credibility, which could lead to the 
„abrupt and arbitrary withdrawal of capital from suspect businesses‟ (ABI, 2002:3). Even 
though independence lies at the heart of the auditing profession, independence concerns can 
be traced back to the nineteenth century (Chandler & Edwards, 1996). Since then, the 
accounting profession has found it difficult to produce a system of standards which 
eliminates conflicts of interest and protect auditors‟ independent mind set. In the UK, 
concerns about auditor independence were heightened as a result of the scandals and 
corporate collapses of the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Maxwell, BCCI, Polly Peck, Barings Bank 
and Lloyd‟s of London). These scandals provoked substantial academic interest in the subject 
of auditor independence (see for example Firth, 1980 & 1981, Shockley, 1981, Dykxhoorn & 
Sinning, 1982, Pany & Reckers, 1983 & 1984, Knapp, 1985, Lindsay, Rennie, Murphy & 
Silvester, 1987, Lindsay, 1989 & 1990, Gul, 1991 and Wines, 1994) and caused some 
changes to the structure and pronouncements of regulatory bodies.  
 
Much has changed in the audit environment since these studies were conducted such as the 
high-profile accounting scandals of Enron, WorldCom and Tyco and a series of mergers and 
the failure of Andersen in 2002, which reduced the “Big Eight” audit firms to a “Big Four”. 
In 2002 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced in the USA to ensure that auditors would be 
seen to be in a position of complete independence. In the UK, the Auditing Practices Board 
(APB) issued „Ethical Standards for Auditors‟ in 2004 (updated in 2008/09). While 
remaining principles-based in nature, these standards are less permissive than previous 
guidelines, especially when combined with an enhanced role for a company‟s audit 
committee in overseeing auditor independence issues and the threat to auditors of regular 
inspections from the Professional Oversight Board‟s Audit Inspection Unit.   
  
 
Despite these regulatory initiatives, fundamental questions over auditors‟ ability to live up to 
the service ideal of professional integrity remain. For example, in the wake of the recent 
banking crisis the UK House of Commons Treasury Committee (2009:77) commented that 
„the fact that the audit process failed to highlight developing problems in the banking sector 
does cause us to question exactly how useful audit currently is‟.  
 
In the light of high-profile corporate collapses and further concentration of the UK audit 
market, the objective of the current study is to gain an insight into how the owners of 
organisations perceive audit work and auditor independence. This questionnaire-based study 
was conducted in the wake of the highly publicised Enron scandal and focuses specifically 
upon investor perceptions of the auditor-client relationships that arguably contributed to 
Andersen‟s failure to prevent Enron‟s questionable accounting practices. These relationships 
are, the joint provision of audit and non-audit services (in 2000 Enron paid $27 million to 
Andersen for non-audit services), an audit firm‟s economic dependence upon a client (on top 
of non-audit fees, in 2000 Andersen also received $25million in audit fees from Enron) and 
long-term relationships between auditor and client (Andersen had audited Enron since 
Enron‟s formation in 1985). 
 
These three auditor-client relationships created a bond between Andersen and Enron: the 
length of tenure resulted in familiarity building up between the two parties, whilst the size of 
audit and non-audit fees that Andersen was receiving made the auditors reluctant to risk 
losing such a lucrative client. Furthermore, these auditor-client relationships were highlighted 
by the UK‟s Auditing Practices Board in 2004 as causing self interest, self-review, 
familiarity, intimidation, management and advocacy threats to auditor independence, but 
since then have not been investigated widely by UK researchers. The International Federation 
of Accountants (IFAC) also acknowledges, in its Handbook of International Auditing, 
Assurance and Ethics Pronouncements (2008), that these three relationships pose a threat to 
auditor independence. Therefore the contribution of this study is the provision of a unique 
and up-to-date account of investor perceptions of auditor independence with a specific focus 
upon whether investors perceive the UK‟s APB „Ethical Standards for Auditors‟ to be 
stringent enough. This research is of value to those academics and accounting professionals 
currently debating the role of the auditor and to those policymakers considering UK 
accounting regulation. Furthermore, given that scandals such as Enron and WorldCom 
  
occurred outside the UK, the findings of this research should also have international appeal 
and especially be of interest to American academics and policymakers. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews relevant 
literature from which hypotheses are developed. The methodology and survey design will 
then be discussed, followed by the results and conclusions of the research.  
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
Both academics and practitioners have struggled to define precisely what is meant by auditor 
„independence‟. Although many definitions of independence exist, the current study is guided 
by DeAngelo (1981:116) who argues that an auditor is independent when on discovering a 
breach of accounting regulations „the auditor will report the breach‟. The following section 
provides an overview of the research into perceptions of auditor independence focussing in 
particular on the areas of economic dependence, the provision of non-audit services and long 
audit tenure. The study builds upon the previous UK perceptions-based work of Firth (1980 
&1981) and Beattie, Brandt and Fearnley (1999), who both sampled the perceptions of users 
and preparers of financial statements of different types of auditor-client relationships. As the 
audit market has changed materially since those studies were conducted, it is expected that 
current perceptions of auditor independence may differ from those previously recorded.  
 
The amount and method by which audit fees are paid to audit firms can create a conflict of 
interest for auditors. In the case of Enron, it is argued that audit fees represented a substantial 
proportion of the local Andersen audit office‟s earnings even without the additional non-audit 
service fee revenue (Haber, 2005:12). The APB identifies this auditor-client relationship as 
potentially independence-impairing, and under its Ethical Standards for Auditors bans audits 
being undertaken on a contingent fee basis, stipulating that if audit fees are outstanding or if 
audit fees from one client regularly exceed 10% of the annual fee income of the audit firm, 
the auditor should withdraw from the audit. Some commentators argue that third party 
perceptions of auditor independence are damaged when an audit firm receives a substantial 
amount of its income from one client (see for example the UK based questionnaire evidence 
reported by Firth (1980, 1981), and Beattie et al. (1999)).  International studies based on the 
results of questionnaires also confirm that economic dependence damages auditor 
independence perceptions. For example, Lindsay et al (1987) confirmed this finding in 
  
Canada, Gul (1991) in New Zealand and Alleyne and Devonish (2006) in Barbados. Other 
research methods have also been employed, with similar findings. Using a case study 
approach, Teoh and Lim (1996), found that large audit fees received from a single audit client 
affected auditor independence perceptions of Malaysian accountants. By using the cost of 
equity capital as a proxy for investor perceptions of the credibility of financial reports, 
Khurana and Raman (2006) found (through regression analysis) that investors perceived 
client dependence negatively, because a positive association between auditor fees and cost of 
equity capital was established. Gosh, Kallapur and Moon (2009) found that client importance 
ratios (ratio of fees from one client to the audit firm‟s total revenue) were significantly 
negatively associated with the earnings response coefficient. From these findings Gosh et al. 
(2009:383) argued that „a negative investor perception exists toward high levels of client 
importance‟. Conversely, Higgs and Skantz (2006) argued that companies who pay relatively 
high audit fees are actually signalling audit quality to investors, giving investors greater faith 
in the company‟s audited financial statements.  
 
As much of the UK perceptions-based work in this area was conducted in the 1980s and 
1990s, this current research will provide an updated account of perceptions of economic 
dependence.  It is noted that economic dependence can refer to a number of different 
situations. The current study will examine the effects of economic dependence at local audit 
office level in light of the apparent dependence of Andersen‟s Houston office upon Enron for 
much of its audit and non-audit income.  
 
The paper starts with the a priori assumption that each of the auditor-client relationships will 
negatively impact upon investor perceptions of auditor independence: 
 
H1: Where an auditor is dependent upon a client for over 10% of its income, it will not be 
perceived as independent.  
 
The conflict of interest which economic dependence creates is further exacerbated when 
auditors provide their clients with non-audit services. Mautz and Sharaf (1961) state that the 
only way for auditors to maintain an appearance of independence is to engage in auditing 
without providing any non-audit work. Whilst the APB has placed widespread restrictions 
upon the provision of non-audit services in its Ethical Standards for Auditors, it has stopped 
  
short of introducing a widespread ban on the practice. Before undertaking non-audit work, 
auditors must now consider whether an informed third party would consider the objectives of 
the non-audit work as consistent with those of the audit. The auditor must assess the threats 
that such work may pose to auditor independence and assess the effectiveness of the 
safeguards in place to eliminate these threats. The APB state that if the threats that non-audit 
work poses to auditor independence cannot be safeguarded against, the auditor must not 
undertake that work, or should withdraw from the audit itself. 
 
Both the UK House of Commons Treasury Committee and the Pensions Investment Research 
Council have expressed significant concerns about the practice of auditors acting as 
consultants. The UK House of Commons Treasury Committee (2009:84) stated that „we 
strongly believe that investor confidence, and trust in the audit would be enhanced by a 
prohibition on audit firms conducting non-audit work for the same company‟. Survey 
research of UK finance directors and audit partners conducted by Beattie et al. (1999) found 
that, consistent with the UK survey conducted by Firth (1980), both groups were concerned 
about the effects of the provision of non-audit services upon auditor independence. Canning 
and Gwilliam (1999) used a multi-method approach (of questionnaires and interviews) to 
determine the effect which the provision of non-audit services had on perceptions of auditor 
independence in the Irish commercial environment. The population of the study comprised 
the main users of financial statements: corporate lenders, investment managers and financial 
analysts. The results showed that over two-thirds of respondents agreed that auditor 
independence decreased when the same personnel provided both audit and non-audit services.  
 
Another questionnaire-based perceptual study was conducted by Quick and Warming-
Rasmussen (2005) in Denmark. Questionnaires were sent to state-authorised auditors, 
managing directors, bank loan officers, private shareholders and business journalists. The 
results showed that all of the groups except the auditors and managing directors viewed an 
impairment of independence when an auditor provides both audit and non-audit services to a 
client. Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2005) concluded that independence in appearance 
was damaged by the provision of non-audit services. As in the current study, the Danish 
questionnaire also tested perceptions of individual non-audit services and found that those 
non-audit services which were perceived to be closer to auditing activities (such as 




In a similar survey, based on German investors, Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2009) 
found that there was a significant level of concern about the provision of non-audit services. 
The investors were asked to indicate their perceptions of 19 different non-audit services. Of 
these services, only two (accounting information systems and forensic services) did not cause 
investors concern.  
 
A US survey conducted by Gaynor, McDaniel & Neal (2006) of audit committee members 
provided indirect evidence that auditor-produced non-audit services damaged investors‟ 
perceptions of auditor independence. The survey revealed that audit committee members 
were less likely to allow joint provision of audit and non-audit services, after the SEC ruled 
in 2002 that audit committees had to pre-approve and disclose all auditor-produced non-audit 
services, even if those services actually improved audit quality. It appears that the committee 
members surveyed believed joint provision could damage investor trust. 
 
Using a case study approach, Solomon, Reckers, & Lowe (2005) focused on the perceptions 
of law students of the provision of non-audit services. These students had to evaluate the 
credibility of a company‟s financial statements and state whether, in their opinion, the 
company would be a good investment. The students were given different case studies, some 
detailing that the company paid audit fees only and some in which the company also received 
non-audit services from its auditor. The results showed that the students expressed a greater 
willingness to invest in companies that received audit services only.  
 
Brandon, Crabtree & Maher (2004) focused their study on bond ratings, and in particular 
bond analysts‟ perceptions of auditor independence in relation to non-audit service provision. 
The results of these tests showed that bond rating analysts acknowledged the proportion of 
non-audit fees to total fees provided by an auditor and incorporated the information into the 
bond ratings as a „significant concern‟ (Brandon et al., 2004:98). Brandon et al. (2004) were 
correct in hypothesising that those companies which purchased higher non-audit services 
from their auditor generally received a lower bond rating.  
 
Krishnan, Sami, & Zhang (2005) examine whether there is an association between levels of 
non-audit service purchases and the earnings response coefficient (ERC). The ERC is a 
surrogate for investors‟ perceptions of auditor independence, because it measures perceptions 
  
of earnings quality. The study was in response to SEC Rule S7-13-00, implemented in 2001, 
which required companies to disclose non-audit fees. Before then, investors were aware only 
of estimates of non-audit service payments. The association of non-audit service purchases 
and ERCs was examined over three quarters of 2001 directly after the SEC ruling. The results 
highlighted that there was investor concern over non-audit service provision, because ERC 
was lower for companies with high non-audit fee ratios. In a similar study, Gosh et al. (2009) 
argued that non-audit fee ratios were not associated with ERC.  
 
New Zealand evidence, based on financial report data from the top 200 companies, suggested 
that there was no link between levels of non-audit fees and an auditors‟ propensity to issue a 
qualified audit opinion (Hay, Knechel and Li, 2006). Despite that evidence, Hay et al. (2006) 
warned that it was possible that non-audit fees would still demonstrate a lack of auditor 
independence in appearance to the public.  
 
In contrast to the above research, a number of perceptual studies implied that non-audit 
service provision did not impair auditor independence. In survey of 49 bank-lending officers 
in New Zealand, Gul (1989) reported that there was no relationship between the provision of 
non-audit services and negative perceptions of auditor independence. The bankers actually 
had more confidence in those auditors who provided non-audit services.  
 
In a case study, Reckers and Stagliano (1981) attempted to examine the perceptions of 
different financial statement user groups of joint provision. The participants were asked to 
rate how they perceived different levels of non-audit service provision to affect auditor 
independence. The sample of participants included 50 financial analysts (sophisticated 
financial statement users) and 50 MBA students (relatively unsophisticated financial 
statement users). The sample was chosen deliberately in order to test the hypothesis that 
concern about non-audit service provision decreases as accounting knowledge and 
sophistication increase (a hypothesis that is re-tested in the current study). The results of the 
survey showed that in each case, the MBA students seemed to have less confidence in the 
auditor‟s independence than the financial analysts did. The finding supported the hypothesis 
that naïve financial statement users have less confidence in auditor independence than 
sophisticated users. However, both groups displayed a high level of confidence in auditors‟ 
ability to remain independent, in each of the cases of non-audit service provision. It was 
  
concluded that the provision of non-audit service did not damage perceptions of auditor 
independence.  
 
Also using a case study approach, Pany and Reckers (1988) studied US loan officers 
reviewing loan applications. Those who were given situations where the client firm received 
non-audit services at 25% of the audit fee (as compared with those at zero, at 60%, and at 
90% levels), were most likely to grant a loan. It could be inferred that the limited level of 
non-audit services gave the loan officer greater confidence in the auditors‟ independence. 
Furthermore, in a study of 776 UK finance directors, Hussey (1999:193) found that the 
majority of the respondents „were content to permit auditors to undertake other work‟. 
Mishra, Raghunandan, & Rama (2005) found that investor perceptions of auditor 
independence varied with the type of non-audit services being provided. Results of their 
study showed that investors displayed more concern for tax and other services (and voted 
against the ratification of auditors who supplied these services) than for audit related services 
 
There appears to be little consensus in the extant literature on the impact of non-audit service 
provision on perceptions of auditor independence, with results of a UK questionnaire based 
study of finance directors, audit committee chairs and audit partners suggesting that not 
providing such services may have a negative impact upon audit quality (Beattie, Fearnley & 
Hines, 2009). In light of the controversy in this area, Krishnan et al. (2005) call for more 
research to be done in this area: 
 
H2: Joint provision of audit and non-audit services will impair perceptions of auditor 
independence. 
 
The threat which economic dependence poses for auditor independence is likely to be even 
greater if the same auditor audits a client for a lengthy period. For example, Brody and 
Moscove, (1998:33) argued that auditors might become less challenging over time, causing 
the audit process to become „stale‟. This assertion is supported by US and Australian 
evidence that suggests audit quality declines as length of tenure increases (see Deis and 
Giroux, 1992; Coupley and Doucet, 1993; Nagy, 2005 and Carey and Simnett, 2006).  Some 
commentators believe that the introduction of mandatory audit firm rotation would result in 
enhanced audit quality, as new auditors would provide a „fresh perspective‟ (ICAEW, 
2002:3). However, it has also been argued that auditor independence is more likely to be 
  
impaired in the early years of a relationship when auditors are still unfamiliar with their client 
(see for example, St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984). In its Ethical Standards for Auditors, the 
APB acknowledges the threat which long tenure can pose for auditor independence. The 
standards stipulate that audit firms must monitor the length of time that key personnel serve 
as members of the audit engagement team, and engagement partners must rotate after five 
years with other key audit personnel rotating after seven years. The standards do not require 
mandatory audit firm rotation.  
 
Perceptions-based studies have produced conflicting evidence on the effect of long tenure. 
UK survey-based studies by Firth (1980 & 1981) and Shockley, (1981) and Hussey and Lan 
(2001) all reported evidence that third-party perceptions were not damaged by long tenure. 
Hussey and Lan (2001) found that the majority of the UK finance directors sampled were not 
in favour of compulsory audit firm rotation. Firth (1981) argued that long tenure meant faster 
audit completion, reduced audit fees, and increased auditor expertise.  
 
However, results of a Texas-based survey conducted by Knapp (1991), suggested that length 
of audit tenure influenced audit committee members‟ assessments of audit quality. Audit 
quality was positively correlated with five-year tenure, but negatively correlated in 
subsequent years. Knapp (1991:47) argued that audit committee members perceived a 
learning curve effect in the early years of the relationship which gradually improved quality, 
but „complacency on the part of the auditor, over-reliance on the client and less rigorous 
audits may account for the erosion of perceived audit quality as audit tenure becomes 
relatively lengthy‟. Other survey-based studies, one involving Malaysian loan officers 
(Bakar, Rahman, & Rashid, 2005) and one of users and preparers of financial statements in 
Barbados (Alleyne and Devonish, 2006), found that the mandatory rotation of auditors would 
promote the perception of auditor independence. A US survey of bank loan officers‟ 
perceptions of audit firm rotation found that 53% of the sample agreed that mandatory audit 
firm rotation should be introduced (Daniels and Booker, 2009).  
 
The studies in this area do not provide current evidence of UK investors‟ perceptions of long 
audit tenure or mandatory audit firm rotation. The current study responds to Knechel and 
Vanstraelen‟s (2007:113) concerns that the effects of long tenure on auditor independence 
have not been „completely answered by extant research‟. The study hypothesises that: 
 
  
H3: Perceptions of auditor independence will be impaired by client employment of the same 
auditor for over five years. 
 
The study will fill the gaps identified in the literature by providing a post-Enron account of 
the ways in which owners, the most important users of audited financial statements, view 
auditor independence. In addition to the main hypotheses laid out above, a number of 
background variables will be examined in order to determine whether they have an effect 
upon investor perceptions of auditor independence. The following hypotheses are stated in 
their null forms: 
 
The level of an individual‟s understanding of accounting was first tested by Reckers and 
Stagliano (1981) who found that those expressing the greatest concern about auditor 
independence were the individuals who had a less „sophisticated‟ understanding of 
accounting. However, evidence provided in studies conducted by Pany and Reckers (1983 & 
1984) and Bartlett (1993) has since rejected the idea that level of accounting knowledge 
affects perceptions of auditor independence. The present study will examine this debate:  
 
H4: There is no difference between investors with and investors without accounting 
qualifications in their perceptions of auditor independence.  
 
The study will provide an original comparison of the views of institutional and private 
investors, previously overlooked by researchers. Since this comparison of investor 
perceptions is original in nature, there is no formal theory to guide hypothesis development. 
However, as private and institutional investors have very different motivations for investing, 
it is expected that differences will be detected in their perceptions of auditor independence. 
Titard (1971) suggested that institutional investors may be more concerned about the issues 
relating to auditor independence than private shareholders because institutional investors‟ 
decisions are of greater significance and higher profile than those made by private investors. 
However, private investors have to make decisions about their own money and could stand to 
lose income as a result of audit failures. Furthermore, it is likely that private shareholders will 
have very little contact with the company in which they invest. The current research will 
compare private and institutional investor perceptions:  
 
  
H5: There is no difference between institutional and private investors in their perceptions of 
auditor independence. 
 
It is possible that men and women will view the three potentially risky auditor-client 
relationships in different ways. There is a lack of research into gender specific investment 
behaviour, although Martenson (2007) argued that the few studies which have been 
conducted found that gender differences did exist in investment behaviour. Studies conducted 
by Hudgens and Fatkin, (1984), Zinkhan and Karande, (1991), Powell and Ansic, (1997), 
Levin, Snyder, and Chapman (2001), Brooks (2002) and Martenson, (2007) have suggested 
that, in business and financial situations, women are more risk-averse than men. Conversely, 
Masters (1989) suggested that there was no difference between men and women in decision-
making and risk-taking. Gender differences in perceptions of auditor independence will be 
tested in this study: 
 
H6: There is no difference between men and women in their perceptions of auditor 
independence.  
 
Method and Sample Selection 
 
As the owners of organisations and the main users of financial statements, investors were the 
sample selected for investigation. The results of the survey highlighted investors‟ reliance 
upon the (audited) financial statements produced by the companies in which they invest. Of 
those sampled, 95.4% of institutional investors indicated that they read company reports 
including 69.7% who read them „thoroughly‟. Similarly, 92.7% of the sample of private 
investors claimed to read company annual reports, including 35.2% who claimed to read 
them „thoroughly‟.  
 
In 2004, a pilot questionnaire was sent to 150 institutional investors to determine perceptions 
of non-audit services. This pilot was important in informing the format and subject matter of 
the current questionnaires. The final versions of the two questionnaires were further revised 
in light of advice and suggestions from colleagues. 
 
The questionnaire design varied slightly between the private and institutional investors in 
order to acknowledge that the institutional investors, as chief executives (or their nominees), 
  
were more likely to be financially literate and familiar with auditor independence issues than 
the private investors about whom very little was known. The private investor version of the 
questionnaire was shorter and did not include questions regarding safeguards and regulations. 
However, the institutional investor version of the questionnaire contained jargon and complex 
questions.  The final versions of both questionnaires comprised four sections: three addressed 
one of the auditor-client relationships and one focused on respondent characteristics. 
  
The first section of the questionnaire examined investor perceptions of long (over five years) 
auditor-client relationships. The five-year horizon was chosen to represent a lengthy auditor-
client relationship, as currently in the UK audit engagement partners are required to rotate 
every five years. Investors were asked to agree or disagree with the statement „a long 
relationship (over five years) between an auditor and a client company is a threat to auditor 
independence‟. The investors were also asked, „how would you rate the UK‟s current system 
of partner rotation every five to seven years as a means of protecting auditor independence?‟ 
and „would the introduction of a system of mandatory audit firm rotation in the UK give you 
greater confidence in the independence of auditors?‟ Those in favour of mandatory audit firm 
rotation were also asked to explain their position.  
 
The second section of the questionnaire examined perceptions of economic dependence. 
Investors were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements: „before investing in 
a company I consider the amount of audit fees the company pays to its auditor‟ and „I would 
not invest in a company if I perceived its auditors to be economically dependent upon it‟.  
The institutional investors were asked „the APB has imposed a 10% limit on income from 
any one client as a safeguard to auditor independence. Do you believe this limit is: adequate, 
not adequate or are you unsure?‟ Section three examined the issue of non-audit service 
provision. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with the following statements: 
„when investing in a company I consider the amount of non-audit services the company 
employs from its auditor‟, „the provision of non-audit services to an existing audit client 
affects my confidence in an auditor‟s ability to remain independent‟, „when one of the Big 
Four accounting firms provides non-audit services to an audit client, I am confident in its 
independence‟ and „when one of the smaller (non-Big Four) accounting firms provides non-
audit services to an audit client, I am confident in its independence‟. Investor perceptions of 
individual non-audit services banned under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were also explored. 
Finally, in the institutional investor version of the questionnaire, perceptions of the 
  
regulations on the provision of non-audit services were investigated. The respondents were 
asked to indicate whether they were in favour of a prescribed audit/non-audit fee ratio, 
strengthened audit committees, mandatory tendering of non-audit services, better justification 
in annual reports of the need for non-audit services and granting shareholders greater powers 
to be involved in the governance of companies. The final section of both questionnaires asked 
respondents for personal information and asked respondents to indicate how thoroughly they 
read the annual report before making investment decisions.  
 
Since no complete list of institutional investors exists, taking a random sample of the entire 
population was not feasible for the current study. Instead, 719 names and addresses of UK 
chief executives were found by searching various databases of insurers, banks, building 
societies, fund managers, pension funds and investment trusts and all 719 received a copy of 
the questionnaire. The databases used to acquire names and addresses included those of the 
Association of British Insurers, the Investment Management Association, the Association of 
Investment Trust Companies, the British Bankers Association, the Building Societies 
Association and the Council of Mortgage Lenders. Furthermore, various on-line lists of fund 
managers and investment trusts were provided by the Financial Times, Find.co.uk, Finance 
Link and Financial Express. The sample therefore represented a wide range of institutional 
investors. 
 
In order to provide a point of comparison with institutional investors‟ perceptions, certain 
private investors were also targeted. The register of members for Amstrad plc and Jarvis plc 
were obtained from Companies House. A random sample of 460 names (excluding 
companies, institutional investors and nominee shareholdings) was taken for each company. 
 
Response Rates and Tests for Bias 
 
The questionnaires were sent out to the investors over the Summer of 2005. Two follow-up 
letters were sent to the institutional investors and one follow-up letter was sent to the private 
investors. Of the 719 questionnaires sent to institutional investors, 113 usable responses were 
received, a response rate of 16%. Of the 920 questionnaires sent to the private investors, 254 
usable responses were received - a response rate of 28%.  
 
  
The results were tested for non-response bias using the approach advocated by Oppenheim 
(1966) and Wallace and Mellor (1988) which takes late responses as a surrogate for non-
responses. A chi-square test was used to compare the responses to the main questions in each 
section between the early and late respondents. No statistically significant relationship was 
found. The tests suggest that the survey was not subject to non-response bias. 
 
Analysis of Results 
 
Table 1 outlines the characteristics of respondents. Institutional investors were predominantly 
male (93.8%) and between the ages of 41 and 60 years old. Fifty eight point four percent 
stated they possessed an accounting qualification and 47.8% of the sample had experience of 
working within one of the Big Four accounting firms. Fourteen point two percent of the 
respondents indicated that they had at one time been an auditor.  
 
Of the private investor respondents, 78.7% were male, with the majority over 60 years old. 
Only 15.1% of the sample possessed accounting qualifications and 85.7% of the sample had 
no experience of working within an accounting firm at all. Only 1.6% stated that they had  
once been an auditor.  
 





The perceptions of institutional and private investors of the three auditor-client relationships 
are shown in Table 2. The respondents were asked to express their perceptions based on a 
five point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree, which was later 
condensed to a three point scale for analysis.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
As the results in Table 2 indicate and in keeping with much of the previous literature, such as 
Lindsay et al., (1987), Bartlett (1993), Beattie et al. (1999) and Alleyne and Devonish (2006), 
both sets of investors are concerned about the effects of economic dependence. The majority 
  
of both sets of investors indicated that they would not invest in a company if they perceived 
the auditor to be dependent upon that company for its income. Results of a Chi-Square test 
(Table 2) conducted separately upon the responses of private and institutional investors to the 
following statement „I would not invest in a company if I perceived its auditors to be 
economically dependent upon it‟ showed that in both cases there were statistically significant 
differences between those who agreed with, disagreed with or were neutral towards the 
statement.  In examining auditing regulation, as can be seen from Table 2, 74.1% of 
institutional investors perceived the 10% limit on fees from a listed client as a sufficient 
safeguard of auditor independence. These findings support H1, because economic 
dependence does negatively affect investor perceptions of auditor independence.  
 
As with perceptions of economic dependence, the majority of both groups of investors (who 
expressed an opinion) indicated that the provision of non-audit services caused concern in 
relation to auditor independence. The results of the Chi-square test in Table 2 revealed that in 
both the cases of the private and institutional investors the responses to the statement: „the 
provision of non-audit services to an existing audit client affects my confidence in an 
auditor‟s ability to remain independent‟, were statistically different between those who 
agreed with, disagreed with or were neutral towards it. These findings support those of 
previous UK perceptions-based studies conducted by Firth (1980) and Beattie et al., (1999) 
who also reported that non-audit service provision caused concern amongst financial 
statement users. Table 3 reports institutional investor perceptions of whether the individual 
non-audit services banned under Sarbanes-Oxley detract from auditor independence. The 
following were perceived to be independence-impairing: internal audit services (as also 
reported by Titard, 1971), valuation of assets and liabilities, investment advice, bookkeeping 
and actuarial services. In general, it appears that it is those non-audit services that involve the 
auditor providing accounting-related services that seem to cause the most concern. Those 
services which caused least concern were tax services (not banned under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, 2002, but found to affect investor perceptions by Mishra et al., 2005), human resources, 
expert and legal services (in contrast to the findings of Quick and Warming-Rasmussen, 
2005) and information systems design and implementation (also found by Titard, 1971 but in 
contrast to the findings of Quick and Warming-Rasmussen, 2005). These results confirmed 
the assertions of Mishra et al. (2005), who found that investor perceptions of individual non-
audit services varied. In all cases, except for information systems design and implementation, 
Chi-square tests revealed that there were statistically significant differences between those 
  
who thought the services detracted, did not detract or might possibly detract from an auditor‟s 
independence.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
The results indicate support for H2, because the joint provision of audit and non-audit 
services impairs auditor independence perceptions. 
  
Interestingly, in accordance with the assertions of McKinley et al. (1985) and Gul (1989), 
32.2% of institutional investors indicated that they would have confidence in the 
independence of a Big Four accounting firm providing non-audit services to a client 
company, but only 21.4% expressed confidence in smaller firms‟ independence.  
 
Safeguards for auditor independence were also considered. The majority of both sets of 
investors indicated that there should be a ban on audit personnel providing non-audit services, 
but that there should not be a ban if a separate division of the same firm provides those 
services.  
 
Alternatives to a prohibition of non-audit service provision were put to the institutional 
investors and are displayed in Table 4. The least preferable of the options was putting non-
audit work out to tender, 54.1% of institutional investors indicated that they would not be in 
favour of such a system, whilst 50.5% of the sample of institutional investors also indicated 
that they would not be in favour of a prescribed ratio of audit to non-audit services for 
companies. Interestingly, 52.7% of the institutional investors were also not in favour of 
giving shareholders greater power to intervene in the governance of companies. The 
reluctance to be more active could be due to fear of assuming more responsibility and 
liability. Institutional investors favoured lower cost options such as strengthening audit 
committees (71.2% were in favour of this course of action) and 58.6% of institutional 
investors were in favour of greater disclosure in annual reports of the need for non-audit 
services. Chi-Square tests (reported in Table 4) revealed that for each of the options there 
were statistically significant differences between those who were in favour, not in favour or 
who were unsure of the alternatives to a prohibition on non-audit service provision. 
 
Table 4 here 
  
 
Finally, perceptions of long audit tenure were explored. The majority of both institutional and 
private investors (who expressed an opinion) - 48.6% and 38.4%, respectively - disagreed 
with the statement „a long relationship between an auditor and a client company is a threat to 
auditor independence‟. Chi-Squared tests (reported in Table 2) revealed that there were 
statistically significant differences between those who agreed, disagreed and who were 
neutral towards the statement. These findings are similar to those recorded by Firth (1980 & 
1981), Shockley (1981), and Hussey and Lan (2001). However, the results suggest that 
private investors are more concerned about long tenure than institutional investors. It is 
possible that in comparison to the assertions made by Firth (1981), institutional investors 
actually view lengthier auditor-client relationships as advantageous. Similar to the assertions 
of Alleyne and Devonish (2006), both groups of investors indicated that they perceived the 
current regulations of partner rotation to be sufficient in protecting auditor independence. 
However, in comparison to the findings of Baker et al. (2005) and Jennings et al. (2006) 
almost half of the private investors were proponents of mandatory audit firm rotation as a 
means for greater protection of investments.  
 
These findings do not support H3, because long tenure does not appear to affect the majority 




Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests were employed to explore the relationships between 
perceptions of the three auditor-client relationships and the following independent variables: 
 
 QUALIFICATION – the respondent does or does not possess an accounting qualification 
 TYPE – the respondent is a private or an institutional investor  
 GENDER – the respondent is male or female  
 
It was not possible to employ more powerful parametric tests as the dependent variables were 




 TENURE - „A long relationship (over five years) between an auditor and a client 
company is a threat to auditor independence‟,  
 ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE - „I would not invest in a company if I perceived its 
auditors to be economically dependent upon it‟,  
 NON-AUDIT SERVICES - „The provision of non-audit services to an existing audit 
client affects my confidence in an auditor‟s ability to remain independent‟.  
 
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the above 
statements based upon a five-point Likert scale where 1 = strongly disagree through to 5 = 
strongly agree (this scale was condensed to a three-point scale for analysis). The results of a 
Spearman‟s Rank Order Correlation test showed that the responses to these three questions 
were positively correlated at the 0.01 significance level (respondents tended to agree with all 
three statements or disagree with all three statements). Therefore, the respondents were 
consistent in their views.  
 
The results of the Mann-Whitney tests are outlined in Table 5: 
 
 




In order to test H4 non-parametric tests were run to determine whether there existed a 
relationship between a respondent‟s possession of an accounting qualification and that 
respondent‟s perception of economic dependence, non-audit service provision and long 
tenure. The results showed that, for the institutional investors, there were no statistically 
significant differences between those with and those without accounting qualifications in 
their perceptions of auditor independence. However, statistically significant relationships 
between private investor perceptions of long tenure and economic dependence and the 
QUALIFICATION variable were found. In each case, the mean rank of the „NO 
QUALIFICATION‟ group was higher than the „QUALIFICATION‟ group, suggesting that 
those without accounting qualifications were more concerned about the threat of long tenure 
and economic dependence than those with qualifications. This confirms the earlier findings of 
  
Reckers and Stagliano (1981). Furthermore, it provides evidence that those who are members 
of the accounting profession appear, at least in some cases, to be more confident in their 
colleagues‟ ability to remain independent than those who are not members of the profession, 
(see Firth 1980, Beattie et al. 1999, Quick and Warming-Rasmussen, 2005).   
 
However, although those private investors without accounting qualifications had a higher 
mean level of concern for non-audit service provision than those with accounting 
qualifications, the Mann-Whitney test was not significant. It is possible that due to the timing 
of the survey (in the wake of the Enron scandal when the dangers of high levels of non-audit 
service fees were well publicised) that all investors were concerned about this auditor-client 
relationship, regardless of their understanding of accounting (as suggested by the results 
reported in the descriptive analysis section).  
 
One explanation for the QUALIFICATION variable‟s lack of effect upon institutional 
investors‟ perceptions could be that even those who indicated that they had no accounting 
qualifications may still have had a good understanding of accounting in their position as chief 
executive (assuming that it was the chief executives themselves who responded). Therefore, 
there may be fewer differences between a qualified and unqualified institutional investor in 
terms of understanding of accounting than compared to a qualified and unqualified private 
investor. The findings of these tests do not support H4, because differences exist between 





The Mann-Whitney test performed upon the TYPE dependent variable on the combined 
(private and institutional) dataset revealed a statistically significant difference in perceptions 
of long tenure and economic dependence between private and institutional investors. The 
tests indicated that the private investor group had higher mean ranks in both cases than the 
institutional investors, indicating that, unlike the assertions of Titard (1971), private investors 
are more concerned about the effect of long tenure and economic dependence upon auditor 
independence than institutional investors.  Fewer of the private investors have accounting 
qualifications, so this finding could be related to the QUALIFICATION finding.  
 
  
Although a slightly higher mean level of concern was recorded for the private investors in 
relation to non-audit service provision, this relationship was not significant. As argued 
earlier, this finding might reflect a general concern amongst all investors regarding the 
independence-impairing effects of non-audit service provision – this explanation seems the 
most likely given the high levels of concern captured by the descriptive findings. These 
findings do not support H5, because there are differences between private and institutional 




H6 cannot be rejected, because the results of the Mann-Whitney tests suggest that there are 





A review of the literature and current UK regulations highlighted that economic dependence, 
non-audit service provision and long tenure had the potential to damage auditor 
independence. Concerns regarding auditor independence have once again arisen because of 
the recent banking crisis in the UK. This study responds to the gap in the current auditor 
independence literature by providing evidence on how well protected the owners of UK 
organisations perceive themselves to be, by auditors and their current Ethical Standards, in 
the wake of the US accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom.  
 
This research started out with three main research hypotheses: that an auditors‟ economic 
dependence upon its client, joint provision of audit and non-audit services by an auditor, and 
client employment of the same auditor for over five years would all impair investor 
perceptions of auditor independence. However, the survey results show that UK investors are 
most concerned about the threats of economic dependence and non-audit service provision, 
and are relatively unconcerned about the threat of long audit tenure. These findings are 
consistent with similar UK studies conducted before the recent wave of audit failures and 
audit market concentration (see Firth, 1980 & 1981 and Beattie et al., 1999).  
 
  
In terms of auditor independence enhancement strategies, this research shows that the 
majority of both sets of investors believe their investments to be protected by the APB‟s 
„Ethical Standards for Auditors‟. Despite indicating some concern about economic 
dependence and non-audit service provision, institutional investors indicated that the current 
regulatory regime should not be changed. As suggested by Beattie et al. (2009), it is possible 
that investors believe that the changes to regulations that were introduced by the APB after 
the recent wave of US accounting scandals sufficiently addresses their concerns regarding 
particular auditor-client relationships.  
 
This study also tested three background hypotheses. These were whether there was a 
difference between respondents with or without accounting qualifications, private and 
institutional investor respondents and male and female respondents in their perceptions of 
auditor independence. Results of non-parametric tests indicated that there is no difference 
between men and women in their perceptions of auditor independence but that those without 
accounting qualifications and private investors are more concerned about auditor 
independence issues than those with accounting qualifications and institutional investors. 
These unique findings imply that it is those who are less familiar with the issues addressed in 
the study who are most concerned about auditor independence, which could be due to a lack 
of understanding or information about the issues.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that the current study is subject to some limitations. For 
example, resource constraints meant that the perceptions of private investors were limited by 
the use of just two medium-sized company shareholder registers. The study could be 
extended and enhanced by sampling the perceptions of private investors from large and small 
UK companies, thus improving the external validity of the findings. Furthermore, the 
conclusions of the study are based upon data collected in 2005, which represent post-Enron 
perceptions of auditor independence. Recent developments in the business environment, such 
as the banking crisis, make it possible that investor perceptions have been subject to further 
changes since the data were collected.  
 
Despite these limitations, this study is the first in the UK to provide a comparison of 
institutional and private investor perceptions of three controversial auditor-client 
relationships. The study has also provided a timely investigation into investor perceptions of 
UK auditing regulations. As investors are one of the main users of audited financial 
  
information, it is important that they perceive auditors to be independent. Without such 
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Table 1 Respondent Characteristics 
   Institutional Investors Private Investors 
Characteristics %   Number of  
respondents 
%  Number of 
respondents 
Male 93.8 106 78.7 200 
Female 6.2 7 21.3 54 
TOTAL 100 113 100 254 
 
 
With Accounting Qualifications 58.4 66 15.1 38 
Without Accounting Qualifications 41.6 47 84.9 214 
TOTAL 100 113 100 252 
 
 
Experience in Accounting Firms: None 38.9 44 85.7 216 
Experience in Accounting Firms: A Small 
Firm 
5.3 6 4.7 12 
Experience in Accounting Firms: A Medium 
Firm 
8.0 9 3.6 9 
Experience in Accounting Firms: Big Four 47.8 54 6.0 15 
TOTAL 100 113 100 252 
 
 
Age- Under 30 yrs 3.5 4 0.4 1 
Age- 30-40 yrs 23.9 27 7.2 18 
Age- 41-50 yrs 30.1 34 13.5 34 
Age- 51-60 yrs 39.0 44 27.5 69 
Age- Over 60 yrs 3.5 4 51.4 129 
TOTAL 100 113 100 251 
 
 
Employed previously as an auditor 14.2 16 1.6 4 
Not employed previously as an auditor 85.8 97 98.4 248 
TOTAL 100 113 100 252 
 
 
Company Employs < 100 44.0 50 N/A N/A 
Company Employs 100-250 18.0 20 N/A N/A 
Company Employs 251-500 10.0 11 N/A N/A 
Company Employs > 500 28.0 32 N/A N/A 









Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 % Institutional Investors % Private Investors 
 Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree 
I would not invest in a company if I perceived 
its auditors to be economically dependent 
upon it 

















It is possible for an audit firm to be 
economically dependent upon a client and still 
maintain its independence from that client 
57.2 15.2 
 
27.7 55.6 19 25.4 
Audit fees alone could not cause an audit firm 
to become economically dependent upon a 
client 
40.2 21.4 38.3 N/A N/A N/A 
The 10% income limit is an adequate 
safeguard for AI 
13.4 12.5 74.1 N/A N/A N/A 
  
 
   
The provision of NAS to an existing audit 
client affects my confidence in an auditor‟s 
ability to remain independent  
















   
When one of the Big 4 accounting firms 
provides NAS to an audit client, I am 
confident in its independence 
29.5 38.4 32. 2 N/A N/A N/A 
When one of the non-big 4 accounting firms 
provides NAS to an audit client, I am 
confident of its independence 
42 36.6 21.4 N/A N/A N/A 
NAS should be banned if audit personnel 
provide them 
33.9 6.2 59.8 26.5 14.2 59.3 
NAS should be banned if different personnel 
provide them 
83 5.4 11.6 55.3 20.9 23.7 
   
 
  
A long relationship (over 5 years) between an 


















   
 
  
Partner rotation is a sufficient safeguard of AI 20.5 2.7 70.5 15 8.3 68.4 
Mandatory audit firm rotation should be 
introduced 
57.1 8 34.8 36.4 14.2 49.4 
 
  




detract from an 
auditor’s 
independence (%) 











Bookkeeping and other 
accounting services 
40.4 13.8 45.9 19.284 
(.000)* 
Information systems design 
and implementation 
41.8 26.4 31.8 4.055 
(.132) 
Valuation of assets/liabilities 30.0 16.4 53.6 23.473 
(.000)* 
Actuarial services  40.0 19.1 40.9 10.055 
(.007)* 
Internal audit services 28.2 13.6 58.2 34.055 
(.000)* 
Human resources, e.g. 
recruitment 
50.0 25.5 24.5 13.764 
(.001)* 
Investment advice  29.1 21.8 49.1 13.164 
(.001)* 
Legal services 42.7 26.4 30.9 4.709 
(.095)*** 
Expert services e.g. providing 
expert opinions 
46.4 28.2 25.5 8.527 
(.014)** 
Tax services, e.g. tax 
compliance and tax planning 






Table 4 Institutional investor perceptions of non-audit service regulations 
 





   
Strengthened audit committees, with 
greater disclosures in the annual report 
71.2 17.1 11.7  72.000 
(.000)* 
   
Better justification in company in the 
annual reports of the need for NAS 
supplied by their auditors  
58.6 18 23.4  32.270 
(.000)* 
   
Making it mandatory for companies to 
put non-audit service work out to 
tender 
27.9 18 54.1  23.081 
(.000)* 
   
Giving shareholders greater power to 
be involved in the governance of a 
company 
20.9 26.4 52.7  19.109 
(.000)* 
   
A prescribed maximum ratio of audit 
to non-audit fees 
31.5 18 50.5  17.676 
(.000)* 
   
        





Table 5 Mann-Whitney Tests  
 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS PRIVATE INVESTORS 
 Mann-Whitney P-Value Mann-Whitney P-Value 
QUALIFICATION     
Economic 
Dependence 
1453.00 0.839 3323.00 0.050** 
Non-audit service 
provision 
1438.00 0.617 3594.00 0.226 
Long Audit Tenure 1415.50 0.660 3036.00 0.025** 
 
 




























 COMBINED DATASET 
TYPE Mann-Whitney P-Value  
Economic 
Dependence 
11401.00 0.002**  
Non-audit service 
provision 
13280.50 0.285  











N/A: Question not applicable to private investors 
 
* Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
*** Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
 
 
 
 
